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An economic irony that is gaining increasing attention is the “resource curse”effect, whereby many of the poorest and most troubled states in the develop-
ing world have paradoxically the highest levels of natural wealth.1  In fact, a  growing
body of literature that suggests resource wealth itself, especially where it accounts
for the bulk of government revenues as in the case of the so-called “rentier states,”2
may harm a country’s prospects for development.  National growth data bear this
out: rentier states with greater natural resource wealth tend to grow more slowly
than their resource-poor counterparts.3
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The “rentier state” syndrome4 is most dramatic in the Arabian/Persian Gulf re-
gion where, beginning in the mid-1980s, relatively stable levels of oil production
and flat oil revenues combined with rapid increases in population have resulted in
declining per-capita income in Saudi Arabia and only modest gains elsewhere.  At
the height of the oil boom in 1980s, the Kingdom’s per-capita income was around
$17,000.  By 2003 this figure had declined to about $8,200, lagging far behind
most of the other Gulf oil producers.5  This decline is even more pronounced if
corrected for inflation and the decline in the dollar exchange rate.
Saudi Arabia’s falling per-capita income has been made even more painful by
increased unemployment, especially after 2000.  Various surveys suggest the un-
employment rate among young Saudis is estimated to be anywhere from 15 to 30
percent.  Furthermore, the unemployment rate among new graduates (in the age
group of 20 to 24 years) is upwards of 27 percent for Saudi men and 33 percent for
Saudi women.  It is hard to comprehend how this state of affairs arose in a country
that is the world’s largest oil producer with one-fourth of the world’s proven oil
reserves.  In the volatile Middle East of the early 2000s, a youthful population with
increasing numbers of job seekers facing growing rates of unemployment has the
potential of becoming a full-fledged economic crisis, perhaps severe enough to
destabilize the regime and bring a new era of uncertainty to the Kingdom.
No doubt the boom-and-bust cycle that has characterized Saudi Arabian eco-
nomic growth since 1973/1974 has been an additional factor underlying the
Kingdom’s poor job-creation record.  Oil revenues, representing 85 to 90 percent
and 75 to 80 percent of total exports and budgetary receipts, respectively, are both
volatile and insufficient for funding development projects needed to stimulate needed
levels of private-sector investment.  In retrospect, the establishment of an oil de-
velopment fund might have buffered the economy from these shocks.
Unless the oil prices of 2003-2004 continue to hold for some time, government
expenditures will be able to absorb only a small fraction of the new labor force
entrants, thus leaving the private sector as the only significant source of new job
creation.  Based on the historical patterns of investment, growth, and new job cre-
ation, only robust investment-led growth in nonoil gross domestic product (GDP)
in the range of 5 or 6 percent can absorb the yearly influx of job seekers.  Since the
mid-1990s, the private sector, while showing encouraging signs of vitality, has not
been up to the task, growing at rates considerably below this 5 to 6 percent range:6
0.9 percent (1995), 4.9 percent (1996), 4.5 percent (1997), 2.6 percent (1998), 4.2
percent (1999), 4.3 percent (2000), 3.7 percent (2001), and 4.4 percent (2002).
Developing a dynamic private sector is critical.  Much of the slowdown in em-
ployment and nonoil growth has stemmed from the decline, over time, in the
government’s ability, to stimulate private-sector output and expenditure simply
through its own public expenditures.  Also, the Kingdom’s current approach to
employment creation, the Saudization program, while well intended has a limited
potential to make a significant contribution to the country’s employment needs.7
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The sections that follow examine ways to invigorate the private sector.  Key to
this objective will be significant progress in the areas of diversification, modern-
ization, and increased competitiveness across the whole spectrum of private
establishments.8  To complement progress in these areas, development strategies
are suggested that are likely to further enhance the Kingdom’s employment cre-
ation potential through shifting resources toward those sectors with the highest
job-creation potential.
Reoriented Development Strategies
The oil/gas sector and the petrochemical industry continue to dominate the
economy in general and the manufacturing sector in particular.  This phenomenon
can be characterized as a single-track development strategy, with focus on the modern
export-oriented segment of the economy.
Diversification in nonhydrocarbon industrial activities has started but is still
relatively modest, with a strong concentration in food, textile, furniture, and house-
hold appliances.  Since the oil/gas/hydrocarbon sectors are largely capital intensive,
they are not a dynamic source of jobs, at least of the magnitudes currently needed.
Clearly, Saudi Arabia needs to exploit its comparative advantage in the energy
area, especially tapping into the rapidly growing natural gas industry.  However,
for significant employment creation more concerted efforts at diversification into
more labor-intensive activities are needed and should proceed based on the exploi-
tation of locational advantages within the Kingdom, such as access to markets,
transport, or nonhydrocarbon resources.  Here, small- and medium-sized firms,
often neglected or overlooked in the past, can play a leading role in solving the
nation’s employment problems.
Programs for Small- and Medium-Sized Firms: In many countries, small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have played a crucial role in creating jobs
and providing economic stability.  In Thailand, for example, a whole new develop-
ment model has centered on SMEs playing a leading role in advancing the economy.
The results have been stunning,9 with growth accelerating since 2002 and pro-
jected to reach 8 percent in 2004.
In Saudi Arabia’s case, SMEs have the potential to play a variety of important
roles: (a) selling their own products, usually finished goods and (b) acting as either
subcontractors for or (c) suppliers of raw materials for larger multinational enter-
prises.  There are several great success stories in creating a large number of jobs
and relatively low costs.  For example, the information technology (IT) job market
is booming in Saudi Arabia, with many positions filled by Saudis working for
SMEs.10  By 2004, SMEs in Saudi Arabia represent almost 93 percent of total
enterprises and account for about 24.7 percent of total employment.11
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Problems Confronting Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Unfortunately,
the information-technology sector is the exception.  In Saudi Arabia, small- (less
than 59 employees) and medium-sized (60-99 employees) businesses to date have
not lived up to their potential for a number of reasons.12  Extensive surveys carried
out by the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CSCCI) and the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization document the main concerns
of businessmen.13
Lack of Credit/Finance/Capital:  The effective cost of capital is often quite high
because regular lending institutions have a difficult time evaluating new businesses,
especially those with unfamiliar production areas.  As a result, lending institutions
often require guarantees or collateral beyond the means of the borrower.  Most
SMEs in the Kingdom are not satisfied with the existing banks/financial institu-
tions.  They find loan procedures very complicated.  Most of them are unable to
meet the demands for personal guarantee and securities.  Many small- and medium-
sized enterprises also contend that,  compared with the terms given the country’s
larger, more established firms, banks are generally too rigid with their terms, exist-
ing loan procedures are too cumbersome, and there is too much difficulty obtaining
loans.14
Dependence on Foreign Resources:  Ironically, given SMEs’ ability in many
developing countries to create local jobs, many of them in Saudi Arabia create very
few employment opportunities.  As part of the country’s Saudization program,
whereby the percentage of the jobs held by Saudi nationals was to reach 30 percent
by the end of 2003,15 many of these companies have managed only marginal
progress—2 percent on average in the case of very small enterprises (1-9 work-
ers).16  As is often the case, imported capital and technology in effect have made
many SMEs dependent on foreign technicians and manpower.  Because of the per-
vasiveness of imported equipment across the Kingdom, many companies face tight
labor markets for skilled workers.
Access to Technology:  On the other hand, the digital divide is a significant
problem for many SMEs in Saudi Arabia.17  Improving access to technological
networks of international standards can be very expensive and out of reach for
many SMEs.
Limited Marketing Skills:  Many SME managers in Saudi Arabia, even by de-
veloping-country standards, have little in the way of formal training in marketing
and product distribution.  As a result, their operations often cannot take advantage
of economies of scale and are high cost.  They are limited to local rather than
export, or even national, markets.  In a survey of 60 existing SMEs in 2000 in the
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia by the Small and Medium Enterprises Develop-
ment Council of the Eastern Province Chamber of Commerce and Industry, over
75 percent of the enterprises reported problems in marketing.18  While in the King-
dom many of these obstacles are more perceived19 than actual, they have had the
effect of stifling the growth of SMEs.
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Bureaucratic Hindrances:  While some progress has been made in cutting bu-
reaucratic red tape, as late as 2001 the Middle East Economic Digest noted that
Approvals can take a long time in Saudi Arabia, and tax the patience of even the hardiest
entrepreneur.  In the water sector, for example, there is currently no tariff, no regulator, no
law and no credible counter-party, so private financing is impossible.  Such legal complica-
tions may take years to clarify.20
The cost of complying with national and international standards also can be
very expensive for SMEs.  This will be the case particularly when Saudi Arabia
joins the World Trade Organization (WTO), where compliance with government
commitments (such as trade-related aspects of intellectual property, etc.) can be
difficult for SMEs.
Limited Information on Possible Markets and Clients:  Many Saudi SME owner/
operators have little experience in exporting into foreign markets.  Similarly, they
have difficulty identifying and attracting foreign investors.  As a result, their firms
are often undersized and cannot expand in line with growing markets.
Compounding these problems is the fact that, because of their lack of access to
credit, Saudi SMEs usually are the most vulnerable in times of economic reces-
sion.  The resulting business failures often add to the severity of the recession.
This problem only will be compounded as the economy moves to a freer price
system21 with the country’s joining the WTO in 2004 or 2005.
Suggested Initiatives:  Unfortunately, government policy toward SMEs has not
been as extensive or as effective as it should and could be.  A 2001 report noted that
...despite the importance of SMEs in the economy, these are unable to benefit from the incen-
tives provided by the government and, due to their small or medium size, commercial banks
view them as high risk borrowers and refrain from funding their needs.22
Given the great potential for job creation in SMEs, government policy initia-
tives clearly are warranted.  Areas for special emphasis should include the following.
1. Training/Human Resource Development:  This covers both on-the-job train-
ing and the broader education system.  There is a strong need to improve skill bases
in a range of areas.
2. Funding for Research and Development:  SMEs lack assistance both for de-
veloping new ideas and turning these ideas into commercial products.
3. Addressing Weaknesses in Transportation and Infrastructure:  This can affect
access to markets and business revenue (telecommunications, ports, airports, road
networks).
4. The Encouragement and Creation of Alternative Financial Sources:  Islamic
financial institutions, such as Modarabas in Pakistan, could play an important role
in providing financial capital on equitable terms in accordance with Islamic codes.
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5. Improving Knowledge of the Legal Environment for SMEs:  The government
has established a series of regulations and provides instruments to support domestic
industry.  Unfortunately, because they now are aware of their options, many Saudi
SMEs work under restrictive licensing agreements with foreign partners.  This
often prohibits the SMEs from exporting and forces reliance on foreign managerial
and technical skills.  Thus, these firms rarely undertake product and process inno-
vation.  By subsidizing e-commerce legal services and related online information,23
the government could enable more advantageous contracts for local firms.
6. Securing Property Rights:  One area that the government seriously should
consider examining in detail is the extent to which property rights can be more
formalized and legalized.  As noted above, one of the main constraints entrepre-
neurs face in Saudi Arabia is collateral for loans.  To what extent is this problem
due to the legal system’s failure to provide secure titles?  Once entrepreneurs have
secure titles to assets, the world of credit opens up because assets can be used as
collateral for lending.  The amounts may be significant.  H. de Soto and his col-
leagues estimated the amount of “dead capital” in untitled assets held by the world’s
poor as at least $9.3 trillion.24
The Saudi authorities appear aware of many of the issues confronting SMEs
and are beginning to respond with effective programs.  In particular, the 2004 na-
tional budget allocates substantial funding for the newly established Loan Guarantee
Fund (LGF), which is charged with granting credit to SMEs at the grass-root level.25
If the LGF can demonstrate its effectiveness in this regard, it could become a prime
tool in attaining the Kingdom’s employment creation goals.
A major advantage of pursuing a strategy favoring SMEs is that their develop-
ment most likely would provide much better regional balance in incomes.  Currently,
high incomes are relatively concentrated in the industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu,
the capital (Riyadh), and the financial and diplomatic center, Jeddah.  SMEs would
bring jobs and higher incomes to many of the towns and villages bypassed in the
Kingdom’s petroleum-based growth.
An SME regional-based strategy probably would not stop the agglomeration of
the Kingdom’s population, but it might slow the process.26  In this regard, a Saudi
SME-oriented regional development program could be modeled to incorporate el-
ements of  the more successful European Union (EU) regional programs, especially
those cropping up throughout the transition economies.27  In fact, there has been a
growing emphasis in EU policy to foster SMEs in the less advanced and more
peripheral regions of the Community and in regions most negatively affected by
structural adjustment and thus less likely to attract foreign investment. As in EU
programs, the goal of fostering job creation and growth in disadvantaged regions
could be implemented through policies aimed at overcoming institutional constraints,
such as obtaining finance and developing an adequate infrastructure.  In Saudi
Arabia these programs would have to be extended to address the need to develop
business skills in areas such as marketing and accounting.
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Return to Unbalanced Growth: Saudi Arabia’s development strategy has
changed considerably over the years.  Initially after the 1973-1973  sudden in-
crease in oil prices and vastly expanded revenues, the government pursued what is
often referred to in the literature as unbalanced growth.28  This particular strategy
entails investment in social overhead (mainly infrastructure) investments.  The
projects were attractive to the authorities since they used imported labor, raw mate-
rials, and management.  In addition, they were highly visible.
The theory underlying this strategy is that it would minimize the amount of
decision making needed in the private sector.29  By making profitable investment
opportunities readily apparent, massive infrastructure investments would induce
the private sector to greatly step up its investment.  In short, the strategy took into
account the vast financial resources of the government as well as the limited entre-
preneurial skills of the private sector.
In retrospect, the strategy was well conceived and began paying fairly high
dividends around 1979.  This approach to the Kingdom’s development allowed the
nonoil economy to sustain fairly respectable growth rates, even during the period
of relatively slack oil revenues in the mid-to-late 1980s.  Its main flaw, however,
was its underestimation of the extent to which Saudi Arabia would remain depen-
dent on an expatriate work force.
Investment on social overhead capital on the scale seen in the late 1970s to early
1980s has not been replicated.  Whereas public investment accounted for around
two-thirds of the overall growth of fixed capital formation between 1970 and 1990,
investment by the private sector constituted around 83 percent of the total invest-
ment between 1991 and 2003.30  Since the mid-1980s, the government has been
unable to fund another significant round of infrastructure expenditures as around
85 percent of public expenditure in the budget is allocated to the salaries of govern-
ment employees and current pensions.
With time, the private sector has expanded to the point where diminishing re-
turns to infrastructure no doubt have set in and, hence, the observed inability of
government expenditures at this time to induce significant amounts of either pri-
vate-sector output or expenditures.31  In essence, the initial post-1973/1974
infrastructure imbalance has been neutralized by subsequent private-sector activ-
ity over the years to the point where an implicit cost subsidy to the private sector no
longer exists.
Clearly, a return to the unbalanced growth development strategy of the 1970s
and early 1980s would expand private-sector investment and growth to the point
where significant improvements in job creation would be sustainable.  It also would
create, through increased investment profitability, opportunities to nurture and de-
velop the Kingdom’s stock of entrepreneurs.
However, the financial costs of this strategy are staggering.  If the country’s
population continues to expand as projected, the Kingdom will be home to 38.5
million people by 2023.  The government has concluded that to respond effectively
178 THE  JOURNAL  OF  ENERGY  AND  DEVELOPMENT
to the country’s infrastructure needs will necessitate the mobilization of invest-
ments worth Saudi riyals (SR) 1,000 billion in the coming 20 years, suggesting a
yearly average of SR50 billion.  This includes investments of around SR438 bil-
lion in the power sector, capital needs of SR340 billion for building water and
sewage projects, around SR100 billion for the natural gas initiative, and the re-
maining funds of SR122 billion for projects in the areas of telecommunication,
roads, airports, and related transportation systems.32
Financing this level of expenditures is possible, but it will require several
initiatives.
1. While the lending capacity of Saudi domestic banks has remained around
SR11 billion a year in the over the 1997-2001 period, thus greatly limiting the role
of these banks in financing SMEs, it has increased somewhat in the last several
years (2002-2004) because of the greater influx of oil revenues.  Most of this in-
crease will not flow into SME loans without some sort of government subsidy  or
guarantee.
2. Clearly, the government will have to redirect expenditures toward economic
services, perhaps at the expense of salaries.33
3. Major efforts will have to be undertaken to improve the efficiency of govern-
ment services and at least start work on seriously tapping nonoil related taxes.
4. Semi-privatization of infrastructure through financial arrangements along the
lines of existing and successful build, operate, and transfer (BOT)34 programs will
have to become the norm in the Kingdom.
While these initiatives are a beginning, other areas of additional support will
have to be tapped.35
So far, the lessons of international experience show that very few government
and donor initiatives  have succeeded in implementing sustainable strategies for
SME development.  To succeed, sustainable SME development will require con-
certed efforts among the various parties concerned, including commercial and rural
banks, leasing companies, and equity providers and consulting and training firms,
internet providers, and local business associations.
Adoption of a Dual-Track Development Strategy: The undertaking of a major
new infrastructure expansion program, by reducing production costs, should pro-
vide a very significant stimulus to private-sector investment.  To assure that this
incentive is not neutralized by insufficient consumer demand, the Saudi authorities
seriously should consider establishing a “dual-track” development model focused
on achieving a more balanced economy.36
Problems Associated with the Existing Oil-Based Development Model (OBDM):
Many of Saudi Arabia’s employment problems stem from the normal difficulties
associated with overreliance on oil exports.  The mechanism that probably has
gained the most attention in academic circles is the so-called Dutch Disease.  This
phenomena has two effects, both of which have impacted the Saudi economy at
one time or another.37
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The first focuses narrowly on the exchange rate.  In technical terms, the “Dutch
Disease,” named after the experience of Holland—where increased natural gas
revenues in the late 1950s resulted in the strengthening of its currency (the guilder)
and the resulting loss of export markets and deindustrialization—refers to the po-
tentially adverse effects of a booming export sector on the performance of other
exports and of industries competing against imports.  In the case of Saudi Arabia,
the real exchange-rate appreciation resulting from a ramp up of oil exports is likely
to reduce the profitability and competitiveness of some agricultural exports, such
as dates, wheat, and dairy products.  It also would encourage imports of food and
raw materials, which may compete with domestic production, while discouraging
the emergence of new manufacturing exports essential for the successful diversifi-
cation of the economy and the creation of jobs.
A second, albeit more problematic, effect of concern for Saudi development is
that, during periods of modernization and expansion of the oil or gas sectors, the
rest of the economy may be “crowded out” in the sense of facing higher costs in
competing for resources.  A-M. Abdel-Rahaman found that domestic investment in
Saudi Arabia may have “crowded out” a certain amount of foreign direct invest-
ment, presumably because of adverse cost developments.38  This effect would not
necessarily be a major inhibitor to private-sector expansion in many areas, how-
ever, since many inputs to hydrocarbon expansion would be fairly specific to that
sector.  On a more general level, D. S. Hakura has shown that in members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), where oil revenues are significant, large gov-
ernments appear to have been a key factor stifling private-sector growth and
impeding diversification.39
Another series of oil-related problems stems the fiscal implications of fluctuat-
ing and uncertain revenues.  While one cannot say that oil revenues create a certain
set of fiscal policy rules, it is a fact that, for the most part, Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf countries have used fiscal policy in a pro-cyclical stabilization pattern.
The net effect has been to intensify the detrimental impact that fluctuations in oil
prices have on the domestic economy.
In addition, oil exporters’ budgetary patterns tend to be an extreme version of
the fiscal rules used in a number of developing nations facing fluctuating revenues.
Many of these countries initiate expanded capital expenditures during periods of
rising revenues on the assumption that these revenues are sustainable.  When rev-
enues decline, budgetary cuts occur, but in a fairly predictable manner.40  In general,
social sectors are less vulnerable to cuts than defense and administration, which in
turn are considerably less vulnerable than production and infrastructure.
Of course, these patterns can be affected by the willingness of countries to as-
sume increased governmental debt in an attempt to maintain programs during periods
of declining revenues.  Another complicating factor, especially for Middle Eastern
oil exporters, is their large budgetary commitment to defense expenditures.  These
factors combine to produce a budgetary pattern typified by the Kingdom, which
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consistently allocates around 30 percent of its budget to defense.  In Saudi Arabia
the following five elements can be observed.41  (1) Typically, increases in planned
defense expenditures come largely at the expense of economic services.  These
reductions carry over to transportation/communications and infrastructure as well.
(2) Economic services, transportation, telecommunications, and other infrastruc-
ture also are reduced when the government experiences unanticipated increases in
the fiscal deficit.  (3) On the other hand, the country’s extensive subsidy program
often is funded with unanticipated increases in the fiscal deficit.  (4) Allocations to
human resource development are increased along with expanded defense expendi-
tures.  (5) In addition to economic services, the government tends to reduce
allocations to municipal services and public lending programs during periods of
expanded defense expenditures.
As noted above, the net effect of these budgetary priorities has contributed to a
decline in the overall strength of government expenditures in stimulating growth
of the nonoil domestic economy.  In part, this stems from the stop-and-start nature
of many infrastructure projects and the generally low priority given economic ex-
penditures during periods of austerity.  In addition, increased levels of public
indebtedness have come at the expense of increased private-sector investments.
The budgetary and exchange-rate patterns associated with the OBDM model
have manifested themselves in a pattern of growth that has set the oil exporters
apart from nonoil Middle Eastern countries.
First, looking at the Middle East as a whole, oil exporters have sustained an
average output growth per capita of 0.83 percent (table 1).  This has been the result
of a growth in physical capital of 2.24 percent and in human capital of 1.96 per-
cent.  Second, these growth rates occurred in an environment characterized by a
negative growth in total factor productivity of 1.22 percent.  Third, in contrast,
nonoil exporters in the Middle East grew about twice as fast (1.59 percent vs. 0.83
percent), invested at a rate about twice that of the oil exporters (4.94 percent vs.
2.24 percent), and had a positive ratio of total factor productivity per output (1.55
percent vs. -1.15 percent).  Fourth, as in the Saudi Arabian case noted above, the oil
exporters allocated a proportionate amount of resources to human capital (1.96
percent vs. 1.86 percent for the nonoil producers).  Fifth and finally, other oil ex-
porters experienced similar patterns, with stagnant growth (0.07 percent) and total
factor productivity per worker declining by 1.74 percent per annum.
While these results should be taken with caution, the dismal performance of oil
exporters is undeniable.  Their established pattern of total factor productivity (TFP)
is especially troubling, with oil exporters averaging significantly lower rates of
TFP than their nonoil counterparts (table 1).  Basically, total factor productivity
reflects technological change and the ability of economic agents to respond
efficiently to price signals in a continuing search for lower costs and greater com-
petitiveness.  In this regard, Saudi Arabia has had one of the lowest rates of TFP,
averaging negative values over much of the period since 1960.  If Saudi Arabia
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Table 1
AVERAGE  GROWTH  OF  OUTPUT  AND  INPUTS  BY  SELECTED  COUNTRY
 
 
    Growth Rate per Worker 
Middle East oil exporters 
First 










Algeria 1948 3.00 3.04 1.85 0.76 0.25 
Iran 1956 1.56 3.02 2.26 -0.95 -0.61 
Iraq 1950 1.14 5.51 1.86 -1.92 -1.68 
Kuwait 1980 -0.35 -4.58 1.55 0.12 -0.33 
Libya 1960 3.68 4.99 2.47 0.38 0.10 
Oman 1970 0.67 4.63 2.11 -2.28 -3.42 
Saudi Arabia 1960 0.70 7.73 1.70 -2.99 -4.24 
United Arab Emirates 1980 -3.74 -6.42 1.89 -2.89 0.77 
 Average  0.83 2.24 1.96 -1.22 -1.15 
Nonoil exporters       
Egypt 1917 2.00 2.63 1.14 0.19 0.09 
Israel 1948 3.10 4.64 2.20 0.10 0.03 
Jordan 1960 1.36 4.16 1.61 -1.09 -0.81 
Morocco 1951 1.77 2.54 1.36 0.02 0.01 
Syria 1953 0.76 4.37 2.25 -2.19 -2.90 
Tunisia 1956 2.61 2.99 2.20 0.15 0.06 
Yemen 1970 -0.44 13.24 2.27 -6.33 14.37 
 Average  1.59 4.94 1.86 -1.31 1.55 
Other oil exporters       
Norway 1855 2.05 2.68 0.89 0.57 0.28 
Nigeria 1952 0.08 3.76 1.12 -1.91 -22.43 
Venezuela 1936 0.55 2.41 1.46 -1.22 -2.21 
Ecuador 1950 1.15 3.32 2.13 -1.36 -1.18 
Indonesia 1951 1.76 4.21 1.72 -0.78 -0.44 
Russia 1917 1.98 3.72 1.74 -0.41 -0.21 
Azerbaijan 1990 -6.40 -4.41 2.92 -6.90 1.08 
Kazakhstan 1990 -0.65 -1.24 2.47 -1.89 2.91 
 Average  0.07 1.81 1.81 -1.74 -2.78 
Southern European       
Cyprus 1950 6.03 6.66 1.81 2.62 0.43 
Greece 1910 2.85 3.41 1.24 0.89 0.31 
Italy 1861 1.79 2.57 0.96 0.30 0.17 
Portugal 1849 1.97 2.46 0.75 0.65 0.33 
Spain 1857 1.34 1.77 0.82 0.21 0.16 
Turkey 1935 1.99 2.12 1.36 0.38 0.19 
 Average  2.66 3.17 1.16 0.84 0.27 
 
 
Source: Adapted from: Scott L. Baier, Gerald Dwyer and Robert Tamura, “How Important are
Capital and Total Factor Productivity for Growth,” Memo, April 2002, available at http://www.
dwyerecon.com/pdf/tfp.pdf.
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wants to achieve better economic performance than the oil-exporter norm, the au-
thorities will have to create an environment that encourages and forces sustained
levels of positive total factor productivity, which apparently is an extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, task if confined to the OBDM model.
Development of a Second Track:  There is still great controversy over the best
way to stimulate TFP.  For some analysts, increased competition, privatization, and
greater incentives for risk-taking are key; for others, the establishment of support-
ing institutions—a sound financial system and efficient, equitable tax systems—play
a central role.  The sections above have noted Saudi Arabia’s progress in several of
these areas.  Given the experiences of other oil-producing countries, however, it is
not apparent that these measures, while desirable in and of themselves, are capable
of restructuring the economy in a manner consistent with the employment demands
currently facing the Kingdom.  An alternative is to pursue simultaneously with the
OBDM model a second track more focused directly on the domestic economy and
small- and medium-sized enterprises.
The rationale for the two-track strategy is straightforward: most developed coun-
tries have a smaller proportion of exports to GDP than do Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf oil exporters.  Therefore, the most developed nations are less vulnerable
to external shocks like a slowdown in the U.S. or world economy or a collapse in
oil prices due to surges in non-OPEC production.
Even nonoil developing countries are moving in the direction of a dual-track
model.  Malaysia, for example, having realized that its economic model before the
Asia Crisis (1997) placed too much emphasis on foreign direct investment and
mass manufactured exports, now is looking for more balanced growth.  In particu-
lar, the government is focusing on a steady strengthening of domestic demand and
diversifying the sources of growth.  On May 21, 2003, a U.S. $1.9-billion eco-
nomic package was announced with about half of the expenditure allocated to
grass-roots initiatives to boost domestic demand.  As in most developing countries,
these expenditures tend to have strong multiplier effects on domestic income and
jobs.  The announced initiatives are to support small- and medium-sized enter-
prises, agriculture, rural development, and new housing for the masses.42
As with Malaysia and several other East Asian countries, this second track of
the Kingdom’s development efforts must focus on the job-creating potential of
SMEs.  Stress on SMEs would not come at the expense of the oil/gas industry;
Saudi Arabia can pursue a dual-track development strategy with foreign invest-
ment flowing into larger, hydrocarbon-based enterprises and, to a lesser extent,
into SMEs.  This first track would continue as the prime foreign-exchange earner.
The second track would be the more locally based SMEs to utilize natural re-
sources and skills to produce for an expanding domestic market.  As noted above,
an increase in Saudi employment, such as that produced by Saudization, would
complement this strategy as the replacement of expatriates by Saudi workers also
creates a much larger domestic demand multiplier.
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The idea is to stimulate domestic demand43 in the short run through increased
government expenditures, while simultaneously searching for new local industries
to develop as part of the diversification away from OBDM activities.  At the same
time, domestic-market-focused policies can achieve structural change by assisting
business in moving up the value-added chain, thus keeping ahead of direct  compe-
tition from the other GCC countries.
Assessment
Beginning in 2000, the most important among a number of positive elements in
the government’s approach toward the private sector seems to be the realization
that a rapidly growing  private sector is essential if any significant progress is to be
made in attacking the unemployment problem and job-creation needs.  The previ-
ous sections outlined several areas that require greater attention in the nation’s
reform program as well as strategies that might be considered to attain greater job-
creation capacity.  Taken as a whole, these policy initiatives have the potential of
not only significantly expanding domestic employment opportunities, but also,
perhaps more importantly, doing so through the creation of a virtuous cycle with
feedbacks between the domestic market and the labor markets (figure 1).
As the previous sections suggest, a virtuous cycle of demand and investment-
led job creation can be generated through the following process.  (1) Shifting
government expenditures back to an infrastructure-led investment strategy should
restore the positive links between government expenditure and private-sector out-
put and expenditure.  (2) Infrastructure-led development can be expected to open
up a number of profitable areas of investment, stimulating increased entrepreneur-
ship.  (3) Within this context, the shift to a dual-track development strategy with a
focus on small- and medium-sized enterprises would assist the creation of new
firms and associated employment.  (4) Relaxing many of the disincentives to for-
eign direct investment would assist in providing these new enterprises with another
source of capital, as well as special technologies, to take advantage of the new
investment opportunities.  (5) The Saudization process, by redirecting a higher
percentage of wages and incomes to the internal market, would provide added
demand for a wide range of domestic consumer goods.  (6) Once the process is
under way, several links between added employment and further demand creation
would reinforce, in a virtuous cycle-type mechanism, the employment creation
capability of the economy.
Still, many challenges and uncertainties remain.  Globalization driven by liber-
alization and new technologies provides opportunities and challenges for the
dynamics of private-sector activity in Saudi Arabia.  On one hand, it creates greater
access to markets, technology, and foreign partners but, on the other, stronger com-
petition, now based not only on price but on quality, delivery, and innovation.
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